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Abstract: This essay reads Guy Debord's theoretical work through its 
primary philosophical and theoretical influences, and in doing so draws 
attention to his concerns with time and history. These concerns are used as a 
means of clarifying Debord's theory of 'spectacle' and of highlighting its 
virtues and failings. The essay uses Debord's remarks on subjectivity and 
temporality to pursue the theoretical dimensions of his interest in strategy, 
and thereby addresses his Hegelian Marxism via his comments on the 
relation between strategy, history and dialectics. His concerns with 
temporality are however also shown to pertain to the theory of spectacle's 
shortcomings as an account of capitalist society. The essay thus attempts to 
draw out some of the more neglected foundational material upon which the 
theory of spectacle rests, contending that the former may be of greater 
contemporary interest than the latter.  
 
Key Words: Debord, Dialectics, Hegel, History, Marx, Situationist, Spectacle, 
Strategy, Time. 
 
Debord, Time and History 
 
 In 1979, seven years after the Situationist International's (S.I.) 
dissolution, Guy Debord claimed that “the S.I. is like radioactivity: one speaks 
little of it, but one detects traces of it almost everywhere, and it lasts a long 
time.”1 Today however the group and its practices are spoken of a great deal, 
and perhaps to the detriment of their corruptive aspirations. Their anti-art 
stance has been canonised into the pantheon of art history, and both 
'psychogeography' and détournement – that “fluid language of anti-ideology”2 
– have become tropes of popular culture. In 1966 the judge presiding over the 
closure of Strasbourg student union felt compelled to describe Situationist 
ideas as “eminently noxious”, and warned that their “diffusion” constituted a 
genuine “threat”;3 today, by contrast, they are actively taught within the 
                                                          
1 Debord 1979a 
2 Debord 1995, p.146; Debord 2006 p.854 
3 Quoted in Dark Star 2001, p.9 
university environment. Outside the lecture hall their popularity has led to the 
French State's purchase of Debord's archives4 and to the use of Situationist 
texts in the promotion of French culture.5  
 One is thus tempted to ask whether this material was ever truly 
'noxious' or 'radioactive' in the first place; a question to which I'll respond here 
in relation to Debord's much adopted, yet much misunderstood theory of 
'spectacle'.6 I'll address this theory by way of Debord's concerns with time, 
history and subjectivity, which I'll contend underlie his oeuvre. I'll show that 
temporality – by way of its relation to subjectivity and historical agency – is 
not only foundational for Debord's theoretical work, but also central to the 
S.I.'s broader ambitions. In consequence, I'll suggest that these themes can 
be used not only to clarify the meaning of Debord's theory, but also to 
highlight its failings and virtues; and through doing so, I'll argue that if any 
aspect of this material can be classed as 'noxious' then it is perhaps not the 
theory of spectacle itself.  
 I'll suggest that Debord's theory can be seen to base its critique of 
capital's 'appearances' on those appearances, occluding the social relations 
from which they arise and thus perpetuating the fetishism that it sought to 
attack. Yet if one addresses the theory through its concerns with time and 
history one can perhaps access something that may be rather more 
interesting, and perhaps also rather more pertinent: for these issues can also 
be used to address Debord's often noted, yet largely unexplored concerns 
with strategy and chance. Furthermore, if the themes of time, history and 
strategy are taken together, one may be able to go some way towards 
reconstructing and evaluating the salient aspects of Debord's Hegelian 
Marxism. I'll show that the latter's emphasis on praxis, autonomy and anti-
dogmatism drives this material's militancy, and thus perhaps also prompts its 
contemporary interest. Consequently, and as opposed to those who would 
claim that Debord's relevance lies in the homologies between his theory of 
spectacle and more recent notions of 'subsumption',7 'real abstraction'8 or 
'semio-capitalism',9 I'll contend that the ideas that found that theory may be of 
greater significance. I'll also advance the contention that these more 
foundational concepts actively invite the supersession of the theory of 
spectacle; and towards the end of the paper I'll also propose that they can in 
fact be seen to stand in contradiction to it.   
 The importance of time and history to this material can perhaps be 
illustrated by way of the following initial clarification of Debord's concept of 
                                                          
4 Gallix 2009 
5 The most recent English translation of The Real Split in the International was “supported by the French 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs” (S.I. 2003, p.v) and the Institut Française du Royaume Uni. 
6 See also my 'Capitalism and Spectacle – The Retort Collective’s Afflicted Powers', written in collaboration 
with the Aufheben group (Aufheben 2009, pp.47-58; see also Aufheben 1997, pp.43-8). 
7 For Hardt and Negri, for example, The Society of the Spectacle “is perhaps the best articulation, in its 
own delirious way, of the contemporary consciousness of the triumph of capital” (Hardt and Negri 2001, 
p.48n). 
8 Jappe 1999 p.16 and passim 
9 Berardi 2004 
spectacle. Contrary to what seems at times to be popular belief, The Society 
of the Spectacle is not a diatribe about the “mass media”: Debord himself 
describes the latter as the spectacle's “most stultifyingly [écrasante] 
superficial manifestation”,10 and states that the spectacle “cannot be 
understood as a product of the technology of the mass dissemination of 
images.”11 The reading that will be advanced here will address Debord's 
claims that the spectacle is a “paralysed history”: an “abandonment of any 
history founded in historical time”, and thus “in effect a false consciousness of 
time”.12  
 In short, the spectacle denotes a relationship with history, or more 
precisely an alienated relation to the construction of history. Debord's famous 
opening détournement of Marx13 corresponds to his contention that capital's 
reversal of subject and object had been “perfected [achevée]”:14 for where 
Marx had claimed that individual subjects had been reduced to the status of 
objects, acted upon by an economy composed of their own alienated activity, 
Debord held that so 'perfect' and ubiquitous was this state of affairs that these 
same individuals had effectively become 'spectators' of their own lives. One is 
thus separated from autonomous control over one's own life, and thus from 
history; a separation that the Situationist project sought to rectify.    
 This interpretation will be developed during the course of this essay, 
and I'll begin by introducing the connection between Debord's views on 
history and his concerns with strategy. To that end we might now look briefly 
at the “strategic conception of writing”15 employed in his Comments on the 
Society of the Spectacle (1988).  
 
Strategy and history 
  
 Debord's Comments have been described as exemplifying the 
melancholic perspective said to characterise his later years. Hussey, for 
example, writes that by 1988 – the year in which the book appeared – “there 
was clearly a sense of defeat in Debord's thought and demeanour”.16 
Merrifield notes the Comments' “dark undertow”,17 and Crary describes it as 
“deeply pessimistic”;18 “as pessimistic”, according to Plant, “as the age in 
which it arises”.19 However, I think it can be suggested that the book's 
diagnosis is by no means as straight forward as might be imagined, and that 
it is certainly less resigned than some have claimed. 
                                                          
10 Debord 1995, p.19; Debord 2006 p.772 
11 Debord 1995, pp.12-3; Debord 2006 p.767 
12 All quotations from Debord 1995, p.114; Debord 2006 p.834 
13 “The whole life of those societies in which modern conditions of production prevail presents itself as an 
immense accumulation of spectacles” (Debord 1995, p.12; Debord 2006, p.766). 
14 Debord 1995, p.11; Debord 2006, p.766 
15 Kaufmann 2006, p.211 
16 Hussey 2002, p.353 
17 Merrifield 2005, p.123 
18 Crary in McDonough 2004, p.462 
19 Plant 200, p.153. Plant is however careful to note that “the picture [the book] paints is by no means 
closed and hopeless” (ibid.). 
 The first thing to note here is the import of history to the Comments' 
analysis. Debord states in this text that “people who lack all historical sense 
can readily be manipulated”,20 and adds that “with consummate skill the 
spectacle organises ignorance of what is about to happen and, immediately 
afterwards, the forgetting of whatever has nonetheless been understood”.21 
Within this “eternity of noisy insignificance”22 nothing, in his view, has been 
“so thoroughly coated in obedient lies”23 as the events of May 1968; events 
that he and the S.I. had claimed in 1969 indicated “the reappearance of 
history”.24 The disappearance of history is thus linked to the deprivation of 
self-conscious agency, and to the denigration of a critical, independent 
standpoint. Yet Debord also adds the following, enigmatic claim: “to the list of 
the triumphs of power we should, however, add one result that has proved 
negative: once the running of a state involves a permanent and massive 
shortage of historical knowledge, that society can no longer be led 
strategically.”25   
 I'll return to this statement towards the end of this essay, after having 
first addressed the theory of spectacle and the ideas that inform it. I'll show 
that those ideas might clarify Debord's linkage of the strategic and the 
historical, and on that basis I'll offer a re-interpretation of the Comments in 
which I'll suggest that it is perhaps not quite as bleak a text as it might seem. 
First however I'll aim to introduce the possible import of this discussion; and 
this might be attempted by noting the Comments' complex unification of form 
and content.  
 Such unification was Debord's principal response to the problem of 
articulating a critique of spectacle within spectacular discourse. The Society 
of the Spectacle, for example, makes extensive use of détournement, and 
thus in a sense actualises its critique through its very enunciation. Many 
further examples can be found throughout his oeuvre,26 but the Comments is 
rendered particularly interesting in this respect by virtue of its account of the 
spectacle's 'integration' into society.27 This latter has often been said to echo 
Baudrillard's account of 'hyperreality',28 yet I would argue that the ideas that 
drive it remain as essentially Hegelian as those advanced in The Society of 
the Spectacle: for where that earlier text described the spectacle's immanent 
negation, the Comments describes the emergence of the spectacle within 
                                                          
20 Debord 2002, p.25, translation altered; Debord 2006, p.1607 
21 Debord 2002, p.14; Debord 2006, p.1601  
22 Debord 2002, p.15; Debord 2006, p.1062  
23 Debord 2002, p.14; Debord 2006 p.1061 
24 S.I. 2006, p.292; S.I. 1997, p.575 
25 Debord 2002, p.20; Debord 2006, p.1605 
26 Debord's cinematic works are similarly composed of détourné films; Debord's autobiography, Panegyric 
(1989), is intended to show through its “subjective extravagance”, the “non-value of current society” 
(Debord 2008, p.228).  
27 ““For the final sense of the integrated spectacle is this – that it has integrated itself into reality to the same 
extent as it was describing it, and that it was reconstructing it as it was describing it. As a result, reality no 
longer confronts the integrated spectacle as something alien.” Debord 2002, p.9; Debord 2006 p.1598 
28 See for example Plant 2000 and Best and Kellner 2000. 
that negation.29 Debord's task, therefore, was not only to give voice to the 
negation of the spectacle, as he had done through détournement in the past: 
in addition, he was to do so in a manner that highlighted and negated the 
spectacle at work within that opposition. 
 Attendant to this was Debord's concern that his work could be studied 
and used30 by those “who devote themselves to maintaining the system of 
spectacular domination”;31 an issue that led him to believe that he must “take 
care not to give too much information to just anybody”.32 In consequence, 
when explaining this latter exigency at the outset of the Comments, he 
presented the book as a kind of puzzle:33 “readers,” he warned, “will 
encounter certain lures, like the very hallmark of the era”; “some elements will 
be intentionally omitted, and the plan will have to remain rather unclear”.34 He 
maintained however that “as long as certain pages are interpolated here and 
there the overall meaning may appear.”35  
 This 'puzzle' is often noted in the literature on Debord, but it remains 
unsolved. Plant for example observes that “there is a great deal more to the 
Comments than sits on the page”,36 but falls short of saying quite what is 
missing; Brown is also left asking what “the missing ingredient”37 might be. 
Kaufmann even goes so far as to claim that “in order to describe a society in 
the grip of a multiplicity of secret services” Debord became “a kind of ironic 
Hercule Poirot”,38 but he gives no indication as to quite what the great 
detective has hidden. I would however suggest that one can begin to resolve 
this problem by noting that Debord's original wording indicates that the book's 
'lures' might lie in its plan or structure, and that the 'hallmark of the era' might 
be an 'encounter' with them:39 a 'hallmark' that would then reflect the reader's 
own susceptibility to such deceit. This can be qualified by the following 
statement, taken from a letter of 1989 to a reader of the Comments: 
 
One can call 'lure' anything that misleads rapid reading or computers. In any 
case, there isn't a single inexact or deceptive piece of information [in my book]. I 
suggest another hypothesis to you: what if, in this book – for a reader capable of 
                                                          
29 “For the highest ambition of the integrated spectacle is ... that secret agents become revolutionaries, and 
revolutionaries become secret agents” (Debord 2002 p.11, translation altered; Debord 2006 p.1599). See 
also Debord's comments on the demise of the S.I. in S.I. 2003.   
30 This is of course easily dismissed, but see Eyal Weizman's work on the Israeli Defence Force's use of 
Debord, Delueze and other such writers as means of re-conceiving urban combat (Weizman 2007).   
31 Debord 2002, p.1, translation altered; Debord 2006, p.1593 
32 Debord 2002, p.1; Debord 2006, p.1593 
33 Cf. Debord's comments on the explanatory diagrams to his 'Game of War': “before they went to the 
printers the figures looked like a truly daunting puzzle awaiting solution, just like the times in which we 
live.” (Becker-Ho and Debord 2007, p.9) 
34 Debord 2002, p.2, translation altered; Debord 2006, p.1594  
35 Debord 2002, p.2; Debord 2006, p.1594  
36 Plant 2000, p.152-3 
37 Brown 1991  
38 Kaufmann 2006, p.264   
39  “On pourra y rencontrer, comme la signature même de l’époque, quelques leurres” (Debord 2006, 
p.1594). Imrie's translation of the second sentence ('readers will encounter certain decoys, like the very 
hallmark of the era'; Debord 2002, p.2) renders Debord's indefinite 'one will be able to' as an inevitable 
'will', and loses the sense in which those 'decoys' may lie in the book's plan or structure.  
understanding dialectical, strategic thought (Machiavelli or Clausewitz) – there 
are in fact no lures? What if the only lure is the very evocation of the possibility 
of there being lures?40   
 
 A very similar point is made in Debord's Cette Mauvaise Reputation 
(1993),41 and again in a letter to a Spanish translator of the Comments.42 Yet 
what is perhaps most important here is the relation between the 'dialectical, 
strategic thought' that Debord requires of his readers and the lack of strategic 
capability that he attributed to the spectacle itself (as noted above), for this 
has two implications: firstly, that a failure to decipher the Comments 
exemplifies the symptom's of the spectacle's eradication of history; and 
secondly, that the skills required to thread one's way through the book would 
seem to pertain to those needed to traverse the integrated spectacle itself.  
 In a suitably dialectical manoeuvre the Comments thus uses the 
spectacle's own nature against it:43 the book's critique presents itself as 
containing 'lures' and hidden meanings, thus evoking the confused and 
illusory nature of the spectacle; it thereby expresses the spectacle's 
integration into its own opposition; through doing so, it guards its own content 
with the same gesture that mirrors the true nature of its object.  
 There are of course any number of objections that one might want to 
make here, not least because this runs entirely counter to any notion of 
popular appeal or intelligibility (Debord was never one to make concessions 
to his audience).44 Yet however problematic it may be, it is perhaps of 
broader interest than its status as a hermeneutic peculiarity: for what comes 
to the fore here is the sense in which Debord's association of history, strategy 
and dialectics offered, in his view, some sort of critical purchase on 
contemporary capitalism.  
 It's worth noting here that an increasing number of commentators have 
taken to making similar claims. Giorgio Agamben once wrote that Debord's 
books “should be used ... as manuals, as instruments of resistance or 
exodus”,45 and with the English publication of Debord's Game of War in 2007 
others have made similar claims (the Class War Games group, for example, 
contends that the Game of War allows “revolutionary activists to learn how to 
fight and win against the oppressors of spectacular society”).46 Yet in the 
absence of an engagement with the material that founds Debord's theory 
                                                          
40 Debord 2008, p.78 
41 “Perhaps [the suggestion of lures] is a lure? Perhaps the only one?” (Debord 1993, p.33). 
42 “I do not believe,” Debord writes, “that one must translate 'lures', originally a term used by hunters and 
that evokes a lost trail, by the brutal trampa [trap] (there is no false information, which might make the 
reader 'fall into error', in my book)” (Debord 2008, p.93).  
43 Sun Tzu is particularly apposite in this respect because of the similarity between the Taoist and Hegelian 
focus on interrelated opposites. See for example Sun Tzu's recommendation that one should “use the 
enemy to defeat the enemy” (Sun Tzu 1988, p.64). Sun Tzu in fact provides the epigraph to the 
Comments, and was said by Debord to be similar to Machiavelli and Clausewitz by virtue of the 
purportedly dialectical aspects of his work (Debord 2008, p.204).  
44 See Kaufmann 2006, pp.232-8 and passim for comments on this tendency.  
45 Agamben 1990 Marginal Notes 
46 Class War Games, 2010 
such statements can remain no more than mere assertions. I will attempt to 
rectify this to some extent, but not by presenting Debord's books as esoteric 
field manuals: rather, I'll show that the philosophical influences that inform 
Debord's work can provide a means of relating his interest in strategy to his 
theoretical concerns and Hegelian Marxism; and through doing so, I'll aim to 
clarify the correlation of historical and strategic thought signalled above. I thus 
hope to shed some light on the mode of thought spoken of in the following 
passage, taken from a letter of 1974:  
 
The principle work that, it appears to me, one must engage in – as the 
complementary contrary to The Society of the Spectacle, which described 
frozen alienation (and the negation that is implicit in it) – is the theory of 
historical action. One must advance strategic theory in its moment, which has 
come. At this stage and to speak schematically, the basic theoreticians to 
retrieve and develop are no longer Hegel, Marx and Lautréamont, but 
Thucydides, Machiavelli and Clausewitz. 47  
 
 Time and subjectivity  
 
 I'll begin by looking at Debord's concerns with temporality, and we can 
start The Society of the Spectacle's claim (made by way of a quotation from 
Hegel) that “man – that 'negative being who is to the extent that he abolishes 
being' – is one [identique] with time”.48 I would argue that the spectacle's 
purported 'falsity' stems from the denial of that unity with time, and I draw 
attention to that here as it entails dismissing the assumption that the theory of 
spectacle is based around the loss of an Arcadian or 'authentic' past (e.g. 
Kaufmann's erroneous claim that Debord “postulates a golden age, a 
humanity originally transparent to itself”),49 or indeed on the future realisation 
or re-institution of an a priori human nature.50  
 The fifth chapter of The Society of the Spectacle “treats,” as Debord 
later explained, “historical time (and the time of historical consciousness) as 
the milieu and goal of the proletarian revolution”.51 Rather than presenting 
Kaufmann's 'humanity originally transparent to itself', this section of the book 
traces the link between forms of temporality and modes of production by 
describing the alienation engendered by the latter in terms of the former. 
During the development and evolution of these modes of social organisation 
the power to shape history is said to grow as it becomes increasingly 
separated from its producers, culminating in the 'perfected' separation of the 
spectacle.52 The latter is presented as a dialectical juncture at which the two 
                                                          
47 Debord 1974 
48 Debord 1995, p.92; Debord 2006 p.820 
49 Kaufmann 2006, p.222 
50 Jappe: “There was no such thing, in [the S.I.'s] view, as some original human nature, complete with its 
desires and its imaginary register, that a bad society had later perverted” (Jappe 1999, p.131).  
51 Debord 1969b  
52 Crary is thus quite wrong when he writes that “a striking feature of Debord's book was the absence of any 
kind of historical genealogy of the spectacle” (Crary in McDonough 2004, p.456). 
extremes can re-unite.  
 The book thus contends that modern society (or rather the society of 
1967) offers a new and previously unrealisable capacity for free self-
determination: a capacity that stems from the conclusion of a tendency 
towards a potential self-consciousness of historical action. For the S.I., labour 
could be superseded through technological automation,53 and it was in this 
sense that the goal of the Situationist revolution was not the possession of 
the means of material production per se, but rather of the means of producing 
one’s own life: the means of attaining the “free consumption of [one’s] own 
time”. 54 This was also informed by the S.I.'s desire to 'realise' art; an ambition 
that deliberately echoed Marx's Young Hegelian concerns with the 
'realisation' of philosophy.55 Where Sartre and the existentialists had “only 
interpreted situations”, the S.I. would now “transform them”,56 and in doing so 
they would unite art and life through the creative, self-determined construction 
of subjective experience. “The point”, Debord claimed in The Society of the 
Spectacle, was “to take effective possession of the community of dialogue, 
and the playful relationship to time, which the works of the poets and artists 
have heretofore merely represented”.57  
 These aspirations, together with the notion that society might be located 
at a grand historical juncture, relate to the S.I.'s response to then prevalent 
question of the absence of a 19th Century proletariat. The latter, as Vaneigem 
put it, had seemingly “disappeared forever beneath an avalanche of sound 
systems, T.V.'s, small cars and planned communities”.58 Yet for Debord and 
the S.I., a “new poverty” and a “new proletariat” 59 had emerged: a 'higher' 
form of poverty that revealed the true, implicit nature of its predecessor. The 
deprivation of the means of subsistence necessarily entails the deprivation of 
the power to freely shape one's existence; thus, whilst the 'wealth' of 
commodity society had remedied the former problematic, the ennui that this 
'wealth' had engendered rendered the latter explicit. Consequently, the S.I. 
felt able to claim that “in the context of the reality presently beginning to take 
shape, we may consider as proletarians all people who have no possibility of 
altering the social space-time that society allots to them.”60  
 I'll return to the implications of that reformulation below, when 
discussing the failings of the spectacle as an account of the operation of 
capital. Here I simply want to indicate the almost existential notion of poverty 
and authenticity that it involves: for despite his stated antipathy to the chief 
proponents of existentialism,61 the manner in which Debord and the S.I. cast 
the human subject as the product of its own experiences and actions owes 
                                                          
53 See Jorn in S.I. 2006, pp.55-8; S.I. 1997 pp.22-5. See also Debord 2002, p.40; Debord 2006 p.1616 
54 Debord 2003, p.15; Debord 2006 p.472  
55 S.I. 2006, p.429 
56 S.I. 2006 p.178; S.I. 1997, p.388 
57 Debord 1995, p.133, emphasis in the original; Debord 2006, p.846 
58 Vaneigem 2003, p.68 
59 S.I. 2006, p.141; S.I 1997, p.309 
60 S.I. 2006, p.141; S.I. 1997, p.141 
61 See for example the S.I.'s article 'Interview with an Imbecile', S.I. 2006 pp.233-5; S.I. 1997, pp.487-8 
much to existentialism's legacy and ambience, as indeed does his focus on 
temporality (although I would also add that his interest in time is also inflected 
by French Hegelianism's interest in Hegel's association of consciousness, 
time and dialectics).62 This is by no means to deny that these notions of self-
determination and self-constitution can be discerned in the more obvious 
influences of Hegel,63 Marx,64 Lukács65 and Lefebvre;66 rather, it is to suggest 
that the French milieu of the 1950's and 60's furthered an emphasis on those 
aspects of Hegelian Marxism. The principal issue however is that Debord 
effectively founds the existential view that “one is what one does”67 upon a 
Hegelian Marxist model of dialectical interaction between subject and 
object.68 This will be developed below when I turn to Debord's views on 
Marx's 'inversion' of Hegel, but here we can note that it underlies his claim 
that the subject is both 'negative' and 'one with time': for as that subject 
abolishes what exists by creating itself and its world anew through its own 
actions, and insofar as it comes to know itself through that process, both the 
subject and its world – qua their continual differentiation – are cast as 
inherently historical.69   
 The corollary of this view is that a denial of self-determination – brought 
about through the restriction of such options and the imposition of set, 
predetermined experiences – would constitute not only a denial of the self, 
but also a separation from one's own time: for if one is and knows oneself 
through what one does, then abdicating autonomy gives rise to a separation 
from one's own objective activity, and thus to an absence of self-
consciousness.70  
 Whilst this owes a great deal to Marx's early discussions of alienated 
labour, it also exhibits (as Jappe has stressed)71 the influence of Lukács' 
History and Class Consciousness (1923). According to Lukács, the alienation 
of the subject from his or her own activity entails an increasingly 
                                                          
62 This association is brought to the fore in the work of Wahl, Koyré, Kojève and Hyppolite. I would also 
suggest that Kojeve's infamous interpretation of Hegel's 'end of history' provided one of the principal 
templates for Debord's theory. 
63 “An individual cannot know what he is until he has made himself a reality through action” (Hegel 1977, 
p.240). 
64 “Objective man ... [is] the outcome of man's own labour” (Marx 1988, p.149). “Labour is ... a process 
between man and nature ... Through this movement he acts upon external nature and changes it, and in 
this way he simultaneously changes his own nature” (Marx 1990, p.283). 
65 “To posit oneself, to produce and reproduce oneself – that is reality” (Lukács 1971, p.15). 
66 “An individual can imagine himself to be a nebula (a cloud) of virtualities (possibilities). ... The processes 
of his practical life consists of a sort of constellation of actions and powers (capacities)” (Lefebvre 2008, 
p.112). 
67 Heidegger 2008, p.283 
68  e.g. “in the working-up of the objective world. ... nature appears [to the acting subject] as his work and his 
reality ... for ... he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in 
reality, and therefore contemplates himself in a world that he has created” (Marx 1988, p.77). 
69 Lefebvre: “The human being is historical and its historicity is inherent to it: it produces and is produced, it 
creates its world and creates itself.” Lefebvre 2008b, p.20 
70 Just as Hegel wrote that “the slave knows not his essence ... and not to know himself is not to think 
himself,” (Hegel 2005, p.xlii), Debord held that “the more [the spectator] contemplates ... his own 
unthinking activity ... the less he understands his own existence and his own desires” (Debord 1995, p.23; 
Debord 2006, p.774) 
71 Jappe 1999, pp.19-31 and passim. 
“contemplative”72 attitude towards the latter; an attitude that had, as a result 
of society's domination by the commodity form, begun to spread beyond the 
factory walls. Debord adopts and expands this position, claiming that all 
social activity now takes place in accordance with the demands of the 
economy.73 His contention is thus that the dialectical relation of mutual 
constitution between self and world has been subverted, resulting in a 
passive subject acted upon by an alien world; albeit a world composed, qua 
commodification, of that subject's own alienated power and activity.74  
 To sum up: the claim that the human subject has been separated his or 
her own time unites the Marxist idea of separation from one's own activity 
with a desire to supersede the separation of art and life, insofar as both were 
to be overcome through the revolutionary institution of free self-determination 
(this was originally to be achieved through the construction of situations, but 
as the S.I. developed it became increasingly associated with libertarian 
council communism). It is in this respect that the concept of spectacle is 
intended to articulate not only the inadequacy of contemporary capitalism, but 
also the possibilities of a post-revolutionary future.  
 
Image and representation 
 
 Before expanding on these themes I'll offer some brief notes as to the 
extent to which their disavowal has furthered a reductively literal reading of 
Debord's visual terminology. This is largely due to the academic trends that 
have characterised Debord and the S.I.'s appropriation, and which have 
resulted in the theory's separation from its Hegelian roots.75 Jappe's Guy 
Debord (1993 in Italian; 1999 in English) remains the sole text to approach 
Debord's Hegelian Marxism in detail, and given this solitary status it's 
interesting to note that Debord himself described it as “the best-informed 
book about me”.76 Yet although Jappe's book certainly brought this dimension 
of Debord's theory to the fore, it does so largely uncritically (Debord also 
                                                          
72 “... activity becomes less and less active and more and more contemplative” (Lukács 1971, p.89, 
emphasis in the original). 
73 “The spectacle subjects [soumet] living men to its will to the extent that the economy has totally 
subjugated [soumis] them” (Debord 1995, p.16, translation altered; Debord 2006, p.769), as the whole of 
modern life now takes place in “uneasy and worshipful subjection to production's needs and results” 
(Debord 1995, p.21; Debord 2006, p.773) 
74 “Workers do not produce themselves: they produce a force independent of themselves” (Debord 1995, 
p.23; Debord 2006, p.774) 
75 Although the group's connection to the radical left was never entirely forgotten or abandoned, they came 
to be adopted by a more cultural and artistic milieu from the late 70's onwards. The exhibition of 
Situationist work in the late 1980's laid the basis for the art-historical and visual cultural readings that 
would later proliferate (e.g. Beller 2006, Crary 2001, Jay 1994, Mitchell 1994). This encouraged the 
assumption that Debord's use of the terms 'image' and 'representation' should be read in a simplistically 
visual register, i.e. as denoting pictures, adverts and the mass media, which fostered both the theory's 
appropriation by media studies and its supposed connection to 'postmodern' notions of 'simulacra' and 
'hyperreality' (e.g. Best and Kellner 2000, Plant 2000). The result of this line of development is thus a 
denigration of the Hegelian ideas that make Debord's theory fully comprehensible. 
76 Debord 2008, p.453 
noted the book's “comprehensive sympathy”).77 Jappe addresses Debord's 
Hegelianism largely by way of the influence of Lukács; and although he 
recognises Debord's interests in time and strategy, he offers little discussion 
of the manner in which they cohere, or indeed how they might relate to his 
Hegelianism or to the rest of his work. Furthermore, although the appearance 
of Jappe's book has entailed that most writers now at least mention Debord's 
Hegelianism,78 few seem to engage with it. Debord's own observation that 
that “one cannot fully comprehend” The Society of the Spectacle “without 
Marx, and especially Hegel”79 thus continues to ring true. 
 In their absence The Society of the Spectacle can indeed be opaque: 
Kaufmann for example, who admits that “the enthusiasm shown ... for Debord 
the theoretician often leaves me ... sceptical”,80 informs us on a page that 
contains no less than nine rhetorical questions (“Do we know exactly what 
Debord means by spectacle? Can we know?”, etc.),81 that the book is “an 
enigma”.82 Yet by far the most prevalent error – as widespread as its 
following formulation is crude – is that encapsulated by a frustrated Jean-
Pierre Voyer: he “used to go to bed late, hoping to find an idea in Guy 
Debord's book”; he discovered that “there are none”, and he concludes from 
this that “when Debord pompously writes 'everything that was directly lived 
has withdrawn into a representation', the prick is simply saying that we see 
posters of naked women pushing brands of cigarettes.”83 Traces of this 
reading can be discerned throughout much of the literature on Debord. Beller 
for example is close to the mark when he tells us that the theory “is merely a 
reformulation in visual terms of Lukács analysis of commodity reification”,84 
but he conflates 'visual terms' with visual phenomena;85 and just as Beller 
only half-grasps the spectacle's connection to the commodity, so too does 
Hussey fall short of its connection to alienation: he correctly notes that 
Debord is doing something “rather more nuanced” than “simply attack[ing] the 
obvious visual manifestations of modern society”, but he believes this to be 
describing those visual forms as uniting “the fragmented aspects of modern 
life”.86  
 Such readings go astray because of their inability to decipher Debord's 
visual terminology. This can perhaps be clarified by way of its largely 
                                                          
77 Debord 2008, p.441 
78 For example, Hussey acknowledges that the theory's “first influence was Hegel” (Hussey 2002, p.216), 
and Bracken writes that “Hegel is ... central to Debord's thought” (Bracken 1997, p.83). 
79 Debord 2004, p.454 
80 Kaufmann 2006, p.xi  
81 Kaufmann 2006, p.73  
82 Kaufmann 2006, p.73 
83 Voyer 1998 
84 Beller 2006, p.241 
85 This pertains to Beller's peculiar notion of an 'attention economy', in which things accrue value via the 
attention paid to them. His account makes extensive use of The Society of the Spectacle in making this 
claim, as he contends that “the visual” for Debord is “the paramount field of capital exploitation” (Beller 
2006, p.278). 
86 Hussey 2002, p.217 
overlooked87 basis in Hegel's notion of Vorstellung (often translated as 
'picture thought' in English, and significantly as 'representation' in French). 
The Vorstellung is a mere 'image' – in the sense of a conceptual 
representation that remains separate from its object – of the “life pulse”88 of 
the Begriff ('Concept'), and is thus a mode of thought that remains estranged 
from its own true nature.89 Debord's claim is that the unity of subject and 
object afforded by self-determined action has been denied by the spectacle, 
and that in separating the subject from his or her own activity spectacular 
society becomes a representation of that unity.  
 This might be explained by way of a few words on the derivation of this 
connection between alienation and representation, which stems in part from 
Feuerbach's presentation of religion as a Vorstellung of human 'species-
being': “Man,” he claimed, first of all sees his nature as if out of himself, 
before he finds it in himself,”90 as “God” is no more than “the mirror of man”91 
(a view echoed by the early Marx).92 Debord's spectacle and its 
representations also involve a notion of reflection93 and speculum;94 yet being 
the “material reconstruction of the religious illusion,”95 these images are not 
merely ideological, but rather involve social practice itself.96 Their 'inverted' 
nature stems from Marx's depiction of a humanity in thrall to its own alienated 
activity,97 which pertains to the notion of falsity outlined above. It's important 
to note however that Debord's 'images' are not Vorstellungen of an original 
essence, but rather of the capacity for self-determination via subject-object 
unity (a point that I'll return to below).  
 As noted above, the concept of spectacle was not only intended to 
define its age but also the latter's capacity for historical change; an intention 
                                                          
87 Bracken mentions the phrase 'picture-thinking' once when signalling the influence of Hegel's aesthetics 
(Bracken 1997, pp.82-3), but he does not analyse the concept or establish its connection to alienation, 
praxis or spectacle.  
88 Hegel 1998, p.37 
89 For example: religion for Hegel is the “inmost region of Spirit”; yet even its highest form, the “revealed 
religion” (Hegel 1977, p.453) of Christianity, remains a mere Vorstellung of the Absolute identity of identity 
and difference accessed by grasping the Begriff through Hegelian philosophy. Crucially, such a 
representation is not false qua its absolute distinction from the Concept: rather, the Concept is its own 
true alienated nature, which it has yet to be united with (hence Hegel's claim that the Christian religion's 
“actual self-consciousness is not the object of its consciousness”, despite which he contends that “the 
content of this picture-thinking is absolute Spirit” (Hegel 1977, p.479)). 
90 Feuerbach 1989, p.13 
91 Feuerbach 1989, p.63  
92 See for example his comments in his 'Introduction to a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right': “Man has 
found in the imaginary reality of heaven where he looked for a superman only the reflection of his own 
self” (Marx 2005, p.71).  
93 The spectacle is “the faithful [fidèle] reflection of the production of things, and a distorting [infidèle] 
objectification of the producers.” (Debord 1995, p.16; Debord 2006, p.769) 
94 “In French, 'spectacle' has the merit of being linked to the Latin speculum and thus to mirror, to the 
inverted image, to the concept of speculation, etc.” (Debord 1980) 
95 Debord 1995, pp.17-8; Debord 2006, pp.770-1 
96 “... the spectacle cannot be set in abstract opposition to concrete social activity” (Debord 1995, p.14; 
Debord 2006, p.768).  
97 “Just as man is governed, in religion, by the products of his own brain, so, in capitalist production, is he 
governed by the products of his own hand” (Marx 1990, p.772). Cf. Debord’s claim that “Our era 
accumulates powers and imagines itself as rational. But no one recognizes these powers as their own.” 
(Debord 2003, p.30; Debord 2006, p.543)  
that stems from Debord's goal of capturing society as a historical totality, 
which echoes Lukács’ own attempt to understand society under the general 
rubric of the commodity.98 The difference is that for Debord the commodity's 
dominance had necessitated a new totalising concept, able to express the 
changes wrought by this ubiquity. 'Spectacle' thus combines a 'perfected' 
alienation, the need to overcome art's representation of life, but also – and 
here we come to the media and visual aspects of the theory – a sense in 
which the separation of subject and object had reached such an extreme that 
it was now made manifest in a society saturated with visual imagery extolling 
capital's virtues (hence, the spectacle is “a negation of life that has become 
visible”).99 Lukács' 'contemplative attitude' had thus truly come to define 
modern society. These contentions also informed Debord's interest in the 
cinema, which was said to be “the best representation of an epoch”100 (see 
also Lefebvre: “someone sitting in front of a cinema screen offers an example 
and a common model of [modern] passivity”).101  
 The media-centric reading of spectacle is thus not wrong per se: rather, 
it focusses on the spectacle's most 'stultifyingly superficial' aspects, and fails 
to see their connection to the broader themes of history, time and self-
determination. As Debord put it in his correspondence: “behind the 
phenomenal appearances of the spectacle (for example, television, 
advertising, the discourse of the State, etc.), that is to say, particular 
mendacious forms, one can find the general reality of the spectacle itself (as 
a moment in the mode of production).”102  
 This however leads us to the problems inherent within his theorisation 
of that mode of production. Having outlined these difficulties I will then return 
to the issue of time, and thereby to the themes of strategy and history 
signalled above.   
 
Spectacle and capital 
 
 I'll suggest here that the theory of spectacle's inadequacy as an account 
of the operation of capital stems from Debord's choice of totalising concept: 
for despite encompassing the issues indicated above, the notion of 'spectacle' 
stresses the subjective alienation of consciousness over the objective 
alienation of activity (i.e. the sale of labour within the capital relation). 
Theorising society as a totality under the rubric of contemplation subsumes 
the specificity and diversity of activity under the ubiquity of alienated 
consciousness, and thus casts production, circulation, work, leisure etc. as 
effectively homogeneous. Or, as Dauvé puts it: Debord and the S.I. “criticized 
                                                          
98 According to Lukács, “The commodity can only be understood in its undistorted essence when it becomes 
the universal category of society as a whole”. (Lukács 1971, p.86) Debord quotes this very same passage 
as the epigraph to the second chapter of The Society of the Spectacle.  
99 Debord 1995, p.14, translation altered; Debord 2006, p.768 
100 S.I. 1997, p 8  
101 Lefebvre 2008a p.32 
102 Debord 1973  
the commodity, not capital – or rather ... criticized capital as commodity, and 
not as a system of valuation which includes production as well as 
exchange.”103 In short, Debord's theory attempts to understand social 
production on the basis of consumption, remaining within the “sphere of 
circulation” without entering “the hidden abode of production”;104 and as a 
result, its critique of appearances is itself founded in part on appearance. 
 That claim can be introduced by enquiring as to whether Debord fell 
prey to the idealism that Lukács later identified within his History and Class 
Consciousness. “Man,” he claimed in 1923, “must become conscious of 
himself as a social being, as simultaneously the subject and object of the 
socio-historical process.”105 This entailed that “society becomes the reality for 
man,”106 and that “nature” became a “social category.”107 However, in his long 
and self-effacing preface to the book's 1967 edition, Lukács wrote that its 
presentation of nature as a social construct had effaced the independence of 
the real, objective world. History and Class Consciousness, he claimed, had 
made the mistake of equating the 'otherness' of the world and the objective 
actions performed within it to the alienation engendered by capital: to use 
Marx's terms from the 1844 Manuscripts (the reading of which led Lukács to 
recognise his own overly subjective errors),108 Entäusserung (the subject 
externalising itself through its own activity) was thus blurred with Entfremdung 
(estrangement from that activity), as all instances of the former were viewed 
in terms of the latter. Consequently, according to the Lukács of 1967, “labour, 
the mediator of the metabolic interaction between society and nature, is 
missing [from the book]”.109 His critique of contemplation had fallen back into 
the “idealistic contemplation”110 of capital's subjective effects: “the proletariat 
seen as the identical subject-object of history” was thus “an attempt to out-
Hegel Hegel”, and “an edifice boldly erected above every possible reality”.111 
 Debord avoids this problem by way of his concern with time, but fails to 
do so in an entirely satisfactory manner. “Time”, he writes, is “a necessary 
alienation”,112 being “the medium in which the subject realises himself while 
losing himself, becomes other in order to become truly himself [pour devenir 
la vérité de lui-même]”.113 The object with which this subject was to unite was 
thus its own action, not nature per se, and a degree of 'necessary' otherness 
and externalisation was thus retained within that unity. However, Debord's 
                                                          
103 Dauvé 1979 
104 Marx 1990, p.279 
105 Lukács 1971, p.19 
106 Lukács 1971, p.19 
107 Lukács 1971, p.234. In other words, “whatever is held to be natural at any given stage of social 
development” is “socially conditioned”(ibid.).  
108 “In the process of reading the Marx manuscript [the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844] all 
the idealist prejudices of History and Class Consciousness were swept to one side” (Lukács 1971, 
p.xxxvi). 
109 Lukács 1971, p.xvii)  
110 Lukács 1971,  p.xviii 
111 Lukács 1971, p.xxiii)  
112 Debord 1995, p.115; Debord 2006, p.835 
113 Debord 1995, pp.115-6; Debord 2006, p.835 
theory does not entirely escape the charge of subjectivism, for although it 
presents capital as the result of alienated social activity it offers little purchase 
on the social relations from which capital arises. The theory of spectacle 
presents all social activity as being effectively homogeneous, because the 
extension of reification and rationalisation beyond the factory walls gives rise 
to a society in which “time” (to borrow Lukács' phrasing) “sheds its qualitative, 
variable, flowing nature”, and is thereby “transformed into abstract, exactly 
measurable”114 space. Yet just as this time had become abstract and 
generalised across social experience, so too had Debord's proletariat: as 
we've seen, the latter had “not been eliminated” by the 'wealth' of commodity 
capitalism, but rather remained “irreducibly present ... in the shape of the vast 
mass of workers who have lost all power over the use of their own lives”;115 a 
'vast mass' that crossed the class boundaries of traditional Marxist analysis, 
being formed, as we saw above, of 'all people who have no possibility of 
altering the social space-time that society allots to them', “regardless of 
variations in their degrees of affluence”.116  
 Debord's effectively existential notion of poverty was thus linked to the 
nature of 'spectacular time': a time that “manifests nothing in its effective 
reality aside from its exchangeability”,117 as all social experience and activity 
had been broken down into abstractly equivalent, functional chunks. Different 
forms of social activity were thus equated to one another (furthered by the 
trope of a disconnected spectator, for whom all life is equally separate), thus 
denigrating the importance of wage labour vis a vis the analysis of capital and 
informing the S.I.'s shift in focus away from production towards the 'everyday' 
(remembering here their contention that labour was to be abolished by 
automation). In short, capital's basis in the objective activity of production was 
neglected as a result of the emphasis that Debord and the S.I. placed on its 
subjective effects. 
 Yet despite the sense in which the revolutionary project was presented 
as having effectively outgrown any preordained focus on surplus value,118 the 
theory of spectacle does nonetheless rely on Marx's notions of fetish and 
appearance; concepts that were intimately linked to the latter's account of the 
wage relation.119 Debord was thus obliged to expand that relation in a manner 
that would allow him to talk of the alienation of life as a whole rather than 
                                                          
114 Lukács 1971, p.90 
115 Debord 1995, p.84; Debord 2006, p.816 
116 S.I. 2006 p.141; S.I. p.309 
117 Debord 1995, p.110, emphasis in the original; Debord 2006, p.831 
118 Debord in fact write that Marx had been drawn onto the terrain of the dominant forms of thought” in that 
he took up “the fundamental science of bourgeois society, political economy” (Debord 1995, p.55, 
translation altered; Debord 2006, p.797); he seems to have viewed this as being  tantamount to 
'economism', and thus to the perpetuation of the abdication of historical agency to “the products of men's 
hands” (Marx 1990, p.165). 
119 “The wage form ... extinguishes every division of the working day into necessary and surplus labour ... All 
labour appears as paid labour. ... All the notions of justice held by both the worker and the capitalist, all 
the mystifications of the capitalist mode of production, all capitalism's illusions about freedom, have as 
their basis [this] form of appearance, which makes the actual relation invisible, and indeed presents to the 
eye the precise opposite of that relation” (Marx 1990, p.680).  
labour per se. This however renders that relation so abstract that it effectively 
becomes a binary opposition rather than a dialectical interaction: within the 
spectacle “the entirety of labour sold”, i.e. the total activity of society, 
becomes “the total commodity”,120 i.e. spectacular life, which is then returned 
in fragments to its fragmented producers. The social, interpersonal 
antagonism of the wage relation thus becomes the opposition of 'humanity' as 
a whole to 'capital', or rather of 'life' to its denial. Thus, although the theory of 
spectacle relies on traditional Marxist concepts it removes their bases; hence 
the contention that it's account of appearances is itself founded on 
appearance, insofar as its use of the concept of fetish could in fact be said to 
exemplify the fetish, as it occludes the social relations from which capital 
arises.   
 This of course stems from the S.I.'s desire to open up a “Northwest 
Passage” through and beyond 19th Century analyses and the models of 
struggle and organisation associated with them.121 Debord and the S.I.'s 
rejection of any sense in which labour might be liberated rather than 
abolished also recalls aspects of Postone's work,122 and for some, such as 
Jappe and the Principia Dialectica group,123 Debord's move away from a 
focus on labour is one of his chief virtues. Whilst making reference to Lukács' 
1967 preface to History and Class Consciousness Jappe contends that the 
latter book's corrected presentation of labour as a constitutive force “turn[ed] 
a characteristic of capitalism into an eternal ontological necessity”.124 For 
Jappe, such a fixation on the primacy of labour and class denigrates their 
historical mutability and thus their potential supersession.125 Yet neither 
Lukács nor the Marx of the Manuscripts equate all constitutive activity to 
contemporary capitalist labour, and there remains a marked difference 
between recognising the characteristics of present circumstances and casting 
them as absolutes. Consequently, and as opposed to those who would hold 
that the relevance of Debord's theory lies in its resonance with contemporary 
issues of real abstraction, I would contend that the theory is itself simply too 
abstract.  
 Having made these claims I will now return to my earlier proposal that 
Debord's concerns with temporality may offer more than a means of 
correcting the interpretation of Debord's spectacle and of highlighting its 
shortcomings. In the sections below I'll suggest that it can also be seen to 
indicate some of the more interesting aspects of his Hegelian Marxism, 
particularly vis a vis the latter's connection to his connection of historical and 
strategic thought.  
                                                          
120 Debord 1995, p.29; Debord 2006, p.779 
121 S.I. 2006 p.147; S.I. 1997, pp.323-4 
122 For Postone, “the working class is integral to capitalism rather than the embodiment of its negation” 
(Postone 1996 17, Postone's italics).  
123 For the Principia Dialectica group Debord did not move far enough from a concern with production. See 
the group's website at: www.principiadialectica.co.uk. 
124 Jappe 1999, p.151 
125 Jappe 1999, p.151 
 
Time and contingency 
 
 As noted above, the publication of Debord's A Game of War in 2007 
has furthered interest in his status as a 'strategist'. An awareness of this 
dimension of his thought and work has also been encouraged by  the flurry of 
intellectual biographies that appeared over the last decade. Yet in the 
absence of the themes of time and subjectivity that I've drawn attention to 
above, this interest can appear to be a mere idiosyncrasy, and thus a means 
by which an author might add a degree of shade to his portrait. Merrifield, for 
example, enjoys picturing a melancholy philosopher-poet given to “ruminate” 
on “quiet, lonely summer days” over classics of military theory;126 Hussey 
presents a self-consciously Machiavellian figure, and Bracken127 similarly 
describes a “player of human chess”.128 Although other writers have 
attempted more detail,129 the theoretical dimensions of Debord's interest in 
strategy and its connection to the more existential aspects of his account 
remain largely ignored.  
 However, if as a result of its identity with time the subject is located in 
perpetual opposition to its present – even to the reality that it has itself 
created, and by extension to its own extant self – then that subject is 
inherently transitory, and characterised by finitude. Particular forms of 
consciousness would then be bound to particular moments and contexts, 
precluding any absolute, trans-historical viewpoint. Actions would thus have 
to be based upon limited knowledge of the factors in play, and this in turn 
means that the dialectical relation between subject and world described 
above must inevitably involve chance (Debord: “all progress, all creation, is 
the organization of new conditions of chance”).130 In other words, the 
construction of history becomes a strategic enterprise: or as Debord put it 
whilst quoting Clausewitz, “one must become accustomed to acting in 
accordance with general probabilities; it is an illusion to wait for a time when 
one will be completely aware of everything”.131  
 This homology between existential and strategic concerns132 pertains to 
                                                          
126 Merrifield 2005, p.11 
127 Bracken's book does contain some genuine insight: “for Debord [the] apprehension of time was coloured 
[by a] Hegelian preoccupation with the self-conscious creation of history with acts of negation”. (Bracken 
1997, p.105).  
128 Bracken 1997, p.viii 
129 Jappe (1999, p.114) proposes that Debord's interest in strategy “could be interpreted as a desire to 
remain moored to a world still essentially intelligible ... and to a high degree predictable”. Strategic 
thought is however an attempt to think with chance, not against it, and it is of interest to Debord because 
time renders the world inherently unpredictable. Kaufmann (2006, p.209) reads Debord under the rubric 
of poetic melancholia, and thus turns a concern with actualising the negativity of time into the tragic 
acceptance of a time that simply happens to us: Debord was concerned with “war and loss”, he claims, 
because “they are two faces of the same hunger for the irrevocable, for experiences that are lost forever”. 
More interestingly, Wark (2008, p.28) has suggested that Debord's Game of War is “really a diagram of 
the strategic possibilities of spectacular time”, but he leaves this claim undeveloped.  
130 Debord 2006, p.296 
131 Debord 2003, p.180; Debord 2006, p.1388 
132 The sense in which Debord's subject is always located within a given context, is characterised by limited 
the S.I.'s goal of transforming life into a game,133 and as I'll show in a moment 
it also becomes particularly significant in relation to Debord's views on Marx's 
'inversion' of Hegel. First however, and in order to introduce the 'openness' of 
Debord's Hegelian view of history, I'll offer some comments on the manner in 
which these issues entail that 'truth' – as opposed to the spectacle's 'falsity' – 
corresponds to historical action and to the contextuality of praxis. 
 As we've seen, the subject's identity with time necessitates autonomy 
and self-determination, and thereby precludes political representation134 (as 
the S.I. put it: “We will only organize the detonation: the free explosion must 
escape us and any other control forever”).135 This is not however to suggest 
that Debord and the S.I. were in favour of “sub-anarchist spontaneism”: 
according to the S.I., anyone who associated them with the latter would show 
that they “simply don't know how to read.”136 Their interpretation of councilism 
does however differ sharply from Lenin's own disavowal of 'spontaneity': for 
where Lenin held that the latter would constitute “nothing more nor less than 
consciousness in an embryonic form”,137 Debord maintained that the 
knowledge required to deal with an insurrectionary situation could never be 
'imputed' by external, intellectual managers,138 but must develop immanently 
through praxis.139 This could not take place through the imposition of an 
identity or a 'correct' ideological perspective, but only through the expression 
of a shared circumstance or problematic. Hence Debord's claim that “we did 
not 'put our ideas into everybody's heads'140 by the exercise of some outside 
influence or other,” but rather “gave voice to ideas that were necessarily 
already present in these proletarian heads”.141 Consequently, whilst Debord 
certainly employs a Hegelian notion of recognition – both in terms of the 
acceptance of theory, but also notably within the councils themselves142 – this 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
knowledge and shapes itself through actualising projects clearly echoes aspects of Sartre's account in 
Being and Nothingness. One can however also detect further homologies: e.g.  “we must decide upon the 
opportuneness of an act and attempt to measure its effectiveness without knowing all the factors that are 
present” (De Beauvoir 1976, p.123); “the only situation a commander can know is his own” (Clausewitz 
1993, p.95), as “war is the realm of uncertainty” (Clausewitz 1993, p.117).  
133 “In the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards” (Clausewitz 1993, 
p.97); Cf. Debord's call for a “ludic model of time” (Debord 1995, p.116, translation altered; Debord 2006, 
p.836), and his observation that “one fights also by playing” (Debord 2002, p.81, translation altered; 
Debord 2006, p.1641) 
134 “We shall never begin to understand Debord's hostility to the concept 'representation,' for instance, unless 
we realize that for him the word always carried a Leninist aftertaste. The spectacle is repugnant because 
it threatens to generalize, as it were, the Party's claim to be the representative of the working class.” 
(Clark and Nicholson Smith 2004, p.479)  
135 SI 2006, p.148; S.I. 1997, p.324 
136 S.I. 2006, p.356; S.I.1997, p.637 
137 Lenin 1988, p.97 
138 “The task of directing the proletariat from without, by means of a disciplined clandestine party under the 
control of intellectuals who had become 'professional revolutionaries', gave rise to a genuine profession ... 
of total social management” (Debord 1995, p.68, emphasis in the original; Debord 2006, p.805)  
139 See theses 123 and 203 of The Society of the Spectacle (Debord 1995 p.89 and 143; Debord 2006, 
p.819 and 829). 
140 An unattributed quotation from the S.I.'s article 'New Forms of Action against Politics and Art', first 
published in Internationale Situationniste 11 (S.I. 2006, pp.275; S.I. 1997, pp.529).  
141 S.I. 2003, p.9 emphasis in the original, translation altered; Debord 2006, p.1089  
142 “The power of workers' councils ... aspires to be recognised – and to recognise itself – in a world of its 
does not involve giving voice to a stable ontological truth, but rather to the 
acknowledgement of a temporary exigency; and as validity stems from an 
ability to diagnose and affect an existing historical tendency, the recognition 
and adoption of theory on the part of those who are to actualise it serves as 
the measure of its truth.143 Hence Debord's claim that Marx's Capital is 
“obviously true and false: essentially, it is true, because the proletariat 
recognized it, although quite badly (and thus also let its errors pass)”;144 
hence also his own and the S.I.'s view that the events of May 1968 
demonstrated the truth of their own arguments.145 
 The subject's identity with time thus casts historical action as a strategic 
enterprise. Yet in doing so, it entails that theoretical truth must itself be 
contingent, or at least historically contextual.146 Consequently, the existential 
aspects of Debord's account and its opposition to representation entail that 
theory can only provide the articulation and clarification of a given moment, 
and this, as I will now suggest, connects to the anti-dogmatism that 
characterises his Hegelianism.  
 
History and Hegelian Marxism 
 
 Debord's view of the relation between Marx and Hegel can be 
introduced by looking at the manner in which Debord held Marx to have 
“demolish[ed] Hegel's detached stance with respect to what occurs”.147 
Having rejected any species-being, essence or telos that might require full 
historical expression, Debord claimed that after Marx “theory thenceforward 
had nothing to know beyond what it itself did”.148 This can be clarified by 
noting Debord's admiration for Cieszkowski's Prolegomena for a 
Historiosophy; a work that he did not discover until “after 1972”149 (and which 
he published through Champ Libre the following year), but which echoes 
many of the themes presented in 1967's The Society of the Spectacle. 
Cieszkowski's significance, in Debord's view, was to have laid – “five years 
before the young Marx, and one hundred and twenty years before the 
Situationists” – the “primary basis” upon which “the modern project of the 
social revolution is constituted.”150 Debord writes as follows:  
 
Cieszkowski annihilates the central aporia of the [Hegelian] system, simply by 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
own design” (Debord 1995, p.127, emphasis in the original; Debord 2006, p.842).  
143 A view that perhaps owes much to Marx's claim in his 'Theses on Feuerbach' that “Man must prove the 
truth ... in practice” (Marx 2005, p.171).   
144 Debord 2004, p.457 
145 See the S.I.'s 1969 essay 'The Beginning of an Era' (S.I. 2006 pp.288-325; S.I. 1997, pp.571-602 
146 For Debord, a theory  “can indeed be relatively 'false' – and thus 'true for historical thought – in that it is 
only 'the maximum of possible consciousness' at this moment in society, which one will explain much 
better after one has left it behind or when one will be more advanced in the endeavour to leave it”. 
Debord 2004, p.456 
147 Debord 1995, p.51, emphasis in the original; Debord 2006, p.795 
148 Debord 1995, p.51; Debord 2006, p.795 
149 Debord 2008, p.84 
150 Debord 1983 
recalling that time had not ended. Hegel had concluded history, in the form of 
thought, because he finally accepted the idea of glorifying the present result. In 
a single movement, Cieszkowski reversed the system, by putting the present in 
contact with the "moment" of the future, because he recognized in the thought of 
history – the supersession of philosophy – the power to transform the world.151  
 
 Cieszkowski's actual objection is in fact slightly different: he contends 
that Hegel, in limiting his focus to the past, failed to think history as a 
totality,152 although he does maintain that philosophy is to be realised as 
praxis.153 The salient point here however is the degree to which the statement 
above illuminates Debord's own view of the relation between Marx and Hegel. 
It certainly chimes with the account presented in The Society of the 
Spectacle: there Debord claimed that the crux of Marx's famous 'inversion' 
was not the “trivial substitution”154 of unfolding categories for developing 
social relations, but rather a more 'horizontal' shift in perspective; for where 
Hegel cast the present as the conclusion of the past, Marx is viewed as 
having rendered every present moment the genesis of an open future. After 
Marx, Debord writes, “history, once it becomes real, no longer has an end.”155 
There is thus no grand cosmological truth or human telos, but only that which 
is created through collective action: for doing away with any notion of an 
intrinsic human essence in favour of an identity with time entails an inherently 
'open' historical dialectic.  
 However, I would suggest that this is not a dialectic without resolution 
per se. Rather than a goal located at the apex of history (i.e. as an epiphany 
or a particular state of affairs within history), Debord seems to cast subject-
object unity as the circular self-perpetuating grounds of an open-ended 
process: for history “has no goal [n'a pas d'objet] aside from whatever effects 
it works upon itself”.156 The same is true on the individual level: life was to 
become “a journey containing its whole meaning within itself”.157 
 This can be clarified by distinguishing it from Lefebvre's historical goal 
of a 'total' or “'de-alienated' man”.158 A “living subject-object”159 said to arise 
immanently from the privations and demands of everyday life, the 'total man' 
constituted a reaction to the purportedly a-political relativism of existential 
freedom,160 but did so by functioning more as a perpetually receding 
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152 “The totality of history must consist of the past and of the future, of the road already travelled as well as 
the road yet to be travelled”. Cieszkowski 2009, p.51 
153 “The future of philosophy in general is to be practical philosophy or, to put it better, the philosophy of 
praxis.” Cieszkowski 2009, p.77 emphasis in the original. 
154 Debord 1995, p.51; Debord 2006, p.794 
155 Debord 1995, p.51; Debord 2006, p.795 
156 Debord 1995, p.48; Debord 2006, p.792 
157 Debord 1995, p.126; Debord 2006, p.842 
158 Lefebvre 1968, p.162  
159 Ibid. 
160 “Existentialism is the philosophy ... of abstract freedom ... the reactionary side of existentialism's present 
influence is here concealed” (Lukács 1973). For Lefebvre, by contrast, “only the notion or idea of the 
absolute [i.e. the total man] gives a sense (in other words both a meaning and a direction) to historically 
acquired knowledge” (Lefebvre 2008a, p.67). 
directional beacon than as an attainable status.161 Lefebvre's own deliberately 
anti-dogmatic dialectic can be seen to maintain its 'openness' through the 
constant deferral of that final synthesis. Debord on the other hand – who is 
perhaps closer to Hegel in this regard than he may have realised – founds his 
own 'open' dialectic upon the establishment of the subject-object unity that 
Lefebvre defers.  
 Casting subject-object unity as the condition for the full flourishing of 
historical agency Debord would seem to put Debord close to Lukács once 
again. Yet for Lukács, “no path leads from the individual to the totality,”162 as 
“the form taken by the class consciousness of the proletariat is the Party”.163 
Insofar as the party alone constitutes the historical self-consciousness of the 
proletariat it remains necessary insofar as that historical agency persists: the 
conditions for a permanently open history are thus the conditions for the 
permanence of the party form, and thus in Debord's view for the perpetuation 
of an “external [extérieure]”164 power tasked with “directing the proletariat 
from without [la direction extérieure du prolétariat]”.165 This is of course 
untenable for Debord. Abstract though his own and the S.I.'s redefinition of 
the proletariat may be, its implications can be seen to offer a clarification or 
rectification of Lukács views on historical self-consciousness: for if subject-
object unity is in essence an agency that is at the same time a self-
determining process, Debord's emphasis on direct, collective self-
determination in workers' councils is perhaps arguably more coherent in this 
regard than Lukács' insistence on party mediation (Debord: “once embodied 
in the power of workers' councils ... the proletarian movement becomes its 
own product; this product is the producer himself, and in his own eyes the 
producer has himself as his goal”).166  
 I would suggest that subject-object unity becomes an entirely self-
determining ground of action in Debord's account: a form of dialectical 
resolution, but one that nonetheless remains perpetually 'open' insofar as it 
continually reformulates its own grounds. If this is so, Debord could perhaps 
be viewed as presenting something similar to Raya Dunayevskaya's own 
Hegelian Marxism, which was not modelled upon any particular stage along 
the paths towards Hegel's 'Absolute' (e.g. the unhappy consciousness or the 
lord and bondsman, both of which inflect Debord's concerns with time and 
negativity via their import within French Hegelianism), but rather upon the 
Absolute itself: for according to Hegel, the latter perpetually recreates itself 
and generates differentiation from itself by virtue of its own, self-determining 
                                                          
161 The total man is presented as “a figure on a distant horizon beyond our present vision” (Lefebvre 2008a, 
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and self-perpetuating necessity. The subject-object unity presented within 
Debord's work can thus be seen to render the “life-pulse”167 of the Concept 
(Begriff) as a continual interplay between subject and object, driven by the 
“universal blood”168 of the negativity and difference of time. One could even 
go so far as to suggest that what Debord offers here is something close to a 
notion of general will,169 albeit one without a “sovereign” (regardless of 
Rousseau's claim that the latter “cannot be represented”);170 it's thus perhaps 
worth noting that for T.J. Clark “the Debord-Rousseau comparison is 
inescapable”.171 
 We might now begin to return to the linkage of historical and strategic 
thought that I signalled at the outset. I've emphasised the sense in which 
strategy can be seen to relate to the subjective, historical projects that 
Debord associated with the authentic temporality denied by spectatorship. 
I've also suggested that this connection between strategy and history stems 
from Debord's incorporation of an almost Sartrean notion of situational, 
limited and future-oriented consciousness into a form of Hegelian Marxism. 
This can now be clarified by noting that it results from his presentation of 
Marx's 'realisation' of Hegelian philosophy as a form of (Hegelian) 
development: i.e. as having rendered explicit that which was implicit within 
Hegel's philosophy. Marx is viewed as showing the latter to imply not Hegel's 
own retrospective historical self-consciousness of a history that had already 
happened, but rather the self-consciousness of a history that was to be made 
via proactive praxis. History becomes agency, and a quasi-existential concern 
with situational, contextual consciousness and self-determination is thus 
inserted into that Hegelian schema, thereby entailing a concern with strategy. 
In consequence, historical and strategic thought become one, producing a 
mode of thought that “allow[s] one” (as Debord put it when describing his own 
“strategic capabilities”) to “see where one is truly going”,172 but which relies 
upon the identity and critical capabilities that stem from knowing where one 
has been. With that in mind, we might now return to Debord's contention that 
spectacular society 'can no longer be led strategically'.  
 
Strategy and tactics in Debord's Comments on the Society of the 
Spectacle  
 
 So why might the spectacular state be unable to function strategically, 
and how might that pertain to the nature of the spectacle? In order to answer 
we should begin by looking at Debord's account of the 'integrated' spectacle, 
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2009, p.17).  
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171 See Clark's foreword in Jappe 1999, p.viii 
172 Debord 2008, p.371 
which he presented in the Comments as a unification of the 'diffuse' 
(commodity capitalism) and 'concentrated' (fascism, state bureaucracy) forms 
described in The Society of the Spectacle, but which also, as noted above, 
was said to have “integrated itself into reality.”173 
 Debord describes the spectacle's advances since 1967 in terms of an 
encroaching military force,174 and claims that it has given rise to an increased 
denigration of historical thought. As history is the “measure of genuine 
novelty”,175 he claims that its erasure aids falsification and furthers the 
propagation of “unverifiable stories, uncheckable statistics, unlikely 
explanations and untenable reasoning.”176 As a result, there is “no room for 
any reply”177 to spectacular discourse, resulting in the subordination of 
dialogue to the spectacle's “enormous positivity”.178 This gives rise to a 
“dissolution of logic”,179 furthered by the media's imposition of a kind of 
generalised immediacy.180 The continuity and development of thought and 
subjectivity through opposition is thus stifled, denigrating “even ... the 
dialectical logic of conflicts”;181 and in the consequent absence of any 
coherent opposition, the spectacle focuses upon itself and its own imagined 
enemies. “Surveillance and intervention”182 thus become increasingly 
important, and “operate on the very terrain of this threat in order to combat it 
in advance.”183  
 This last point is alluded to again in the book's somewhat cryptic 
penultimate section. Debord quotes Clausewitz's classical definition of 
strategy and tactics (“tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the 
engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war”),184 
and following a long discussion of the manner in which the introduction of 
new weaponry in the Napoleonic era gave rise to new tactics Debord 
indicates that the spectacle's development and 'integration' will give rise to 
similar revelations on the part of its rulers;185 a point that pertains to his view 
that conflicts are possessed of a 'dialectical logic' that engender development 
on both sides. Yet whilst doing so, he also draws attention to Napoleon's 
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“strategy ... of using victories in advance”.186 The spectacle's manipulation of 
its own opposition would thus seem to be linked to Napoleon's skill at 
dictating the actions of his enemies. It might also be noted that Debord's 
comments on Napoleons' ability to use victories “as if acquired on credit”187 
seems to stem from Clausewitz's analysis; the latter claimed that “Bonaparte 
could ruthlessly cut through all his enemies strategic plans in search of battle, 
because he seldom doubted the battle's outcome”.188 As strategy is 
influenced by tactical events, tactical superiority (in terms of the manoeuvre to 
battle) and successes (in terms of its victory) can sabotage the enemy's 
strategy; and as Clausewitz stresses, Napoleon's success stemmed from 
allowing tactical events to shape his own unfolding strategy and to confound 
that of his opponents.  
 Debord would seem to be implying that the symptoms of the spectacle's 
'integration' into society – and thus of its eradication of history – constitute a 
similar ability to 'ruthlessly cut through' an enemy's strategy (which as we've 
seen is connected to historical consciousness); hence his connection of 
Napoleonic “changes in the art of war”189 to spectacular “changes in the art of 
government.”190 Yet he also maintains that history's eradication has resulted 
in a lack of coherent organisation and continuity. It would thus seem that 
although the spectacle is able to organise its own opposition 'in advance', its 
'strategy' is dictated purely by the momentum of its own tactical victories; a 
momentum that military historians have described as both the strength and 
the weakness of Napoleon's approach: according to Handel, for example, its 
danger is that “instead of becoming the driving force in war, strategy becomes 
a mere by-product or afterthought”.191  
 For Debord, “an all-powerful economy” has become “mad” (this, he 
claims, is “precisely what defines these spectacular times”),192 and now 
ploughs on towards self-destructive situations; whilst discussing ecological 
issues, Debord remarks that it “has now come to declare open war against 
humans; not only against their possibilities for life, but against their chances 
of survival”.193 It's perhaps also significant that Clausewitz's own comments 
about Napoleon's approach to strategy are made during a discussion of the 
art of defending against enemy invasion: referencing Napoleon's Russian 
debacle of 1812,194 Clausewitz stresses, in suitably dialectical fashion, that 
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the further an attack progresses the weaker it becomes; and it would seem 
that for Debord the spectacle's absence of strategic guidance entails that it 
too is to advance beyond what Clausewitz refers to as its 'culminating 
point'.195  
 In his later years Debord maintains his 1967 contention that the 
increasing abundance of spectacular commodities is inversely proportional to 
their ability to satisfy; a position that he maintains into the 1990's.196 He also 
seems to hold that the spectacle's progress from concentration through 
diffusion to integration has caused the spectacle to wear increasingly 
thin:.“the same question,” he wrote in 1992, “is about to be posed again 
everywhere: how can the poor be made to work once their illusions have 
been shattered, and once force has been defeated?”197 I would thus contend, 
and as opposed to the writers mentioned above who would present the 
Comments as overtly 'pessimistic', that Debord is still maintaining the merits 
and possibility of mass political action (in a letter referring to his work on the 
book he himself joked that “the work of revolutionary critique is assuredly not 
to lead people to believe that the revolution has become impossible!”).198  
 The problem, however, is the manner in which this opposition was to 
arise. This notion of weakening illusions was coupled to an alleged increase 
in the quasi-existential poverty described above, and in consequence 
Debord's later writings bring the problematic aspects of his earlier account to 
the fore. “Each person”, Debord complains in 1985, “no longer has an 
individual history in and through which he discovers and forms his own 
tastes”.199 Such 'individual history' was to emerge from the classless ennui of 
spectacular consumption, rather than from the oppositional relations and 
antagonistic experiences of capital;200 and in dismissing “the immense efforts 
that have been made by the 'practical men' of our era to manage to not 
understand what is most important”, Debord concludes that “it is only 
necessary to know how to love.”201  
 
Conclusion 
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 That rather banal assertion can be seen to stand in contradiction to the 
implications of Debord's Hegelian Marxism: firstly, insofar as the notion that 
the spectacle will continue to advance beyond its 'culminating point' echoes 
the passivity that Debord attributed to economic determinism, thus 
contradicting his focus on pro-active, constitutive action within time; and 
secondly, to the degree that the abstract subjectivism of the concept of 
spectacle, which this assertion reflects, can be seen to contradict the need to 
study a historical context in sufficient depth to be able to affect and move 
beyond it. This can be elaborated by noting that the anti-dogmatism and drive 
towards action and reformulation that characterises Debord's Hegelian 
Marxism casts theoretical works as being akin to tactical interventions: they 
are only as valid as their ability to define or affect a given context, and are 
thus specific to that context As Debord himself put it:  
 
Theories are only made to die in the war of time. Like military units, they must 
be sent into battle at the right moment; and whatever their merits or 
insufficiencies, they can only be used if they are on hand when they are needed. 
But they have to be replaced because they are constantly being rendered 
obsolete – by their decisive victories even more than by their partial defeats.202   
 
 However, Debord's own views on his theory would seem to depart from 
this. In 1979 he declared that he had “no doubt that the confirmation all my 
theses encounter” would “last right until the end of the century and even 
beyond”;203 according to Prigent's anecdote, Debord thought this period of 
validity would extend as far as 2030.204  
 I've attempted to show that both this assumption and the drive towards  
reformulation that it would seem to contradict stem from Debord's concerns 
with time. On the one hand, that concern furthers his focus on praxis and anti-
dogmatism. Yet on the other, it also informs his overly subjective perspective; 
a perspective that engendered disconnection from the changing realities of 
historical struggle through its abstraction and romanticisation of the latter. I 
would contend, therefore, that one can discern an internal contradiction within 
Debord's work: a contradiction between the theory of spectacle and the ideas 
that found it, insofar as the latter would seem to imply the contextuality and 
thus the consequent supersession of the former. The implication is that this 
more foundational material points beyond the theory that rests upon it.  
 I opened this essay by discussing the degree to which the S.I. had been 
'recuperated' by art, culture and academia, and suggested that the ease with 
which this assimilation had been achieved might indicate that their output was 
perhaps not quite as 'noxious' as some might like to believe. Through the 
discussions above I've attempted to show how this might be seen to connect 
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not only to the theory of spectacle's somewhat opaque visual terminology, but 
also to its replacement of social antagonism with a dichotomy between 'life' 
and its denial. I've addressed this by way of Debord's linkage of historical and 
strategic thought, which I pursued through Debord's concerns with time and 
history, and I hope that in doing so I've succeeded in opening up some of the 
more interesting and relevant aspects of his Hegelian Marxism. This, I would 
argue, is a version of Hegelian Marxism that avoids any notion of final telos or 
original essence, and which is opposed to party representation: it presents 
subject-object unity as the grounds of collective self-determination rather than 
as an ineffable goal, and is inherently opposed to any stratification into 
dogma. And, given that it would seem to actively invite the theory of 
spectacle's supersession, I would propose that Debord's views on time, 
history and dialectics may be of potentially greater contemporary interest than 
that of their ability to clarify his work.  
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